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CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRE-TRIAL & TRIAL
Donald Colleluori *
Gary D. Eisenstat **
Bill E. Davidoff ***
The major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Survey
period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In recent years, the Texas Supreme Court’s docket has been crowded with
cases raising issues of subject matter jurisdiction. This trend continued during
the Survey period. In Rusk State Hospital v. Black,1 the supreme court reaffirmed
the principle that governmental immunity from suit implicates a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. 2 Accordingly, a court of appeals can consider the
immunity defense even if it is raised for the first time on interlocutory appeal
under Section 51.014(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 3 Although
that statute creates an exception to the general rule allowing appeals only from
final judgment and is therefore strictly construed, the supreme court reasoned it
could not be construed so as to effectively “require appellate courts to address
the merits of cases without regard to whether the courts have jurisdiction.” 4
In reaching its decision, the majority recognized (but declined to address) the
argument that saying governmental immunity “implicates” subject matter
jurisdiction does not necessarily “equate” to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
for all purposes.5 In a partial dissent, however, Justice Lehrmann was not so
reticent.6 Her dissent argued that immunity is properly understood as
* B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University School of Law. Partner, Figari &
Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., University of Colorado; J.D., Boston University School of Law. Partner, Figari &
Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
Partner, Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2013).
2. Id. at 95.
3. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a) (West 2009); see Black, 392 S.W.3d at
95.
4. Black, 392 S.W.3d at 95.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 102 (Lehrmann, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority described the dissent as
advocating a “change in the nature of immunity in Texas,” which it acknowledged was an
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implicating both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and because a party’s
objection to the latter can be waived (unlike a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction), governmental entities should be required to raise their immunity
defense in the trial court. 7 The dissent pointed out the significant consequences
of equating immunity with a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, specifically that
it would allow a governmental entity (or the plaintiff suing it for that matter) to
litigate a case to conclusion and, if dissatisfied with the result, simply attack the
judgment as void after the fact. 8 Given the seriousness of the dissent’s concern,
it seems likely that the supreme court will have to address this issue again soon
in another case where it has been properly raised and briefed.
After raising the issue itself, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the
plaintiff homeowners had standing to challenge administrative interpretations
issued by the Finance and Credit Union Commissions pursuant to their
authority under the 2003 amendment to the constitutional provision governing
home equity loans in Texas. 9 Although the challenged interpretations were not
in effect when the homeowners had secured their own home equity loans, and
they did not specifically allege that they intended to acquire new loans, plaintiffs
argued that the potential interference with their prospective interest in future
home equity loans was sufficient to establish standing. The supreme court
agreed. 10 The court focused on the unique circumstances of the home equity
amendment’s safe-harbor provision that protects lenders who comply with the
Commissions’ interpretations. 11 Thus, the applicable interpretations could not
injure a home equity borrower because the constitutional provision deemed the
lender’s compliance with those interpretations lawful. 12 The only injury that
could be redressed, therefore, was the injury to a party’s interest in obtaining a
future home equity loan unimpaired by the Commissions’ alleged
misinterpretations.13 Under these circumstances, the supreme court seemingly
relaxed the ordinary requirement that a plaintiff show a concrete and
particularized injury. 14 Indeed, the court suggested that even a homeowner who
did not intend to apply for a new loan suffered an injury as well because of the
Commissions’ misinterpretations. 15 The opinion makes clear, however, that the
home equity provision at issue “create[d] an exceptional context in which to
assess standing,” 16 and it is doubtful whether litigants can extend the supreme
court’s reasoning to establish standing for plaintiffs claiming this type of passive
injury in other cases.
Standing in the class action context was at issue in Heckman v. Williamson

important issue but was unnecessary to its decision and had not been raised by the parties. Id. at 97.
7. Id. at 104–08.
8. Id. at 107–08.
9. Fin. Comm’n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 584 (Tex. 2013).
10. Id. at 582–83.
11. Id. at 581.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 583.
15. Id. at 583–84.
16. Id. at 584.
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County. 17 The court of appeals had dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because “not one of the named plaintiffs had standing to pursue all
of the putative class’s claims.” 18 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, requiring
only that at least one named plaintiff have standing for each claim asserted in the
case. 19 The supreme court noted that this is the consensus rule in the federal
courts, and it follows logically from the fundamental principle that courts must
analyze the standing of each individual plaintiff to bring each individual claim. 20
The fact that the named plaintiff also seeks to represent a class should not
increase his burden to establish standing. 21
II. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
In Moncrief Oil International, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, the Texas Supreme Court
elaborated on the type of evidence that will or will not be sufficient to establish
that a non-resident has the requisite minimum contacts for personal
jurisdiction. 22 The plaintiff there alleged that the defendants misappropriated
trade secrets that were disclosed to them in Texas and tortiously interfered with
the plaintiff’s existing and prospective business relationships by using those
trade secrets to compete. Noting that “specific jurisdiction requires us to analyze
jurisdictional contacts on a claim-by-claim basis,” 23 the supreme court first held
that the defendants’ attendance at two meetings in Texas where the trade secrets
were allegedly disclosed to them was sufficient to show that they had
purposefully availed themselves of doing business in Texas. 24 The supreme court
brushed away the defendants’ argument that their only purpose in coming to
Texas was to discuss settlement of a separate dispute, explaining that at the
jurisdictional phase, the relevant inquiry is the defendants’ actual business
contacts with the state and not what they thought or intended. 25
Conversely, the supreme court also held that the special appearance evidence
was insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction as to the tortious interference
claim. 26 This claim focused on the defendants’ alleged attempt to convince a
third party not to proceed in a joint venture with the plaintiff, as well as their
establishment of a competing enterprise in Texas. Even though the defendants’
original receipt of the plaintiff’s claimed trade secrets was a necessary predicate
to the interference claim, the supreme court held that “but-for causation alone is
insufficient” and that the interference claim was centered on discussions
between the defendants and the third party that occurred in California. 27 Since
17. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012).
18. Id. at 150 (emphasis original).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 151–53.
21. Id. at 153–54.
22. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2013).
23. Id. at 150.
24. Id. at 154.
25. Id. The supreme court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the information they
received at the meetings was not truly trade secret, noting that this went to the merits of the
plaintiff’s claim and not personal jurisdiction. Id. at 156, n.15.
26. Id. at 156.
27. Id. at 157.
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the competing enterprise in Texas was a separate legal entity, and the plaintiff
did not establish that it was the defendants’ alter ego, these facts also failed to
support the exercise of specific jurisdiction. 28
Texas courts continue to grapple with the effect of e-commerce on traditional
personal jurisdiction principles. In a case of first impression in Texas, the Dallas
Court of Appeals rejected an attempt to ground jurisdiction on the choice of law
and forum selection clauses from a document that was available on the
plaintiff’s website and referred to in the contract documents. 29 The court of
appeals explained that, although the document was referred to in the parties’
agreement, it was not specifically incorporated by reference. 30 Nor did the
agreement plainly state that the referenced document contained additional
terms and conditions or was otherwise intended to become part of the contract;
instead, it suggested that the document contained “informative material only.” 31
III. VENUE
In In re Lopez, 32 the Texas Supreme Court was asked to determine the
appropriate county for a motion to vacate an arbitration award when the
hearing has been held in a different county than the one designated in the
parties’ agreement. Here, the arbitration agreement provided that “[t]he
arbitration hearing and all related proceedings shall be conducted in Victoria
County, Texas, unless otherwise agreed upon.” 33 The parties decided to hold the
arbitration hearing in Travis County instead. Afterwards, the losing party filed
an application to vacate the arbitration award in Victoria County. It argued that
venue was mandatory in Victoria County under Section 171.096(b) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which states that if an arbitration agreement
“provides that the hearing before the arbitrators is to be held in a county in this
state, a party must file the initial application [to vacate the arbitration award]
with the clerk of the court of that county.” 34 The prevailing parties, however,
argued that venue was mandatory in Travis County under Section 171.096(c) of
the same code, which states that “if a hearing before the arbitrators has been
held, a party must file the initial application [to vacate the arbitration award]
with the clerk of the court of the county in which the hearing was held.” 35 The
supreme court concluded that because the latter provision speaks specifically to
the situation in which the hearing has already occurred, it should control, and
the court required that the motion to vacate be filed in the same county where
the arbitration hearing had been held. 36

28. Id.
29. Bob Montgomery Chevrolet, Inc. v. Dent Zone Cos., 409 S.W.3d 181, 193 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2013, no pet.).
30. Id. at 190.
31. Id.
32
. In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. 2012).
33
. Id. at 175.
34
. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE ANN. § 171.096(b) (West 2009).
35
. Id. § 171.096(c).
36. Lopez, 372 S.W.3d at 176.

2014]

Civil Procedure: Pre-Trial & Trial

105

IV. PARTIES
The Texas Supreme Court once again addressed the differences between
misnomer and misidentification in Reddy Partnership/5900 North Freeway, LP v.
Harris County Appraisal District. 37 In this property tax case, the Harris County
Appraisal District (HCAD) mailed a Notice of Appraised Value of Property to
“Reddy Partnership, ETAL.” A notice of protest was filed by Reddy Partnership,
ETAL and rejected by the HCAD’s appraisal review board. Subsequently, Reddy
Partnership, ETAL petitioned for judicial review to challenge the board’s
determination. Fifteen months later, after the statute of limitations to appeal the
board’s order had expired, HCAD contended that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because “Reddy Partnership, ETAL” was not the owner of
the property and, therefore, lacked standing. Reddy Partnership, ETAL
amended its petition to name Reddy Partnership/5900 North Freeway, LP as
the plaintiff and owner of the property, alleging that it had not properly
identified itself in the original petition. “The trial court granted HCAD’s
jurisdictional plea and dismissed the suit. . . . The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that because the suit had not been filed by the property owner, the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”
The supreme court first discussed the differences between the doctrines of
misidentification and misnomer. “Misnomer arises when a party misnames itself
or another party, but the correct parties are [actually] involved” in the suit.38 In
contrast, misidentification “arises when two separate legal entities actually exist
and a plaintiff mistakenly sues the entity with a name similar to that of the
correct entity.” 39 The court noted that there are harsh consequences for
misidentification but not for misnomer. 40 Instead, trial courts generally should
allow plaintiffs to correct their pleadings when they have misnamed but sued the
correct defendant. 41 The supreme court held that in cases like this, where the
plaintiff has misnamed itself, the rationale for flexibility that governs in the
typical misnomer case “applies with even greater force.” 42
V. PLEADINGS
In John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC, 43 the Dallas Court of Appeals
analyzed the concepts of “standing” and “capacity.” In this case, the plaintiff
filed suit for breach of contract and quantum meruit to collect amounts allegedly
due for advertising services. The defendants filed a general denial and further
asserted that the plaintiff lacked the capacity to sue and that the defendants were
not liable in the capacity in which they were sued. However, the defendants did

37. Reddy P’ship/5900 N. Fwy, LP v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 370 S.W.3d 373 (Tex.
2012).
38. Id. at 376 (internal quotations omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
41. Id. at 377.
42. Id.
43. John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC, 408 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013,
pet. denied).
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not verify their answer as required by Rule 93(1). 44 The plaintiff subsequently
moved for summary judgment, and one hour prior to the hearing on plaintiff’s
motion, the defendants filed an amended answer that included a verified denial
alleging that plaintiff lacked capacity to sue and that the defendants were not
liable in the capacity in which they were sued. The trial court granted summary
judgment and the defendants appealed.
On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiff had failed to establish it
had standing because it was neither a direct party nor a third party beneficiary
under the contract at issue. The court of appeals initially noted that the
defendants had confused the concepts of standing and capacity. 45 “A plaintiff
has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting
with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act,
regardless of whether it has a judiciable interest in the controversy.” 46 Unlike
standing, a litigant can waive its claim that an opposing party does not have the
capacity to participate in a suit. 47 Here, the issue was not whether the plaintiff
had standing to bring the suit, but instead whether it could recover in the
capacity in which it sued.
Based on the foregoing, the court then analyzed whether the defendants had
waived their capacity argument because their verified denial was untimely. The
court explained that it will generally presume the trial court granted leave to file
a late pleading, even though the filer did not request leave, when: “(1) the record
fails to show that the trial court did not consider the amended pleading; and (2)
there is not a sufficient showing of surprise or prejudice on the part of the
opposing party.” 48 However, that presumption does not apply when the
judgment does not affirmatively state that the trial court considered all the
pleadings on file. 49 Here, because the final judgment stated that the trial court
considered all the pleadings “timely filed,” the court of appeals concluded that
the amended answer was not considered and affirmed the summary judgment. 50
VI. DISCOVERY
Discovery sanctions continued to be a frequent topic in the case law during
the Survey period. In JNS Enterprise, Inc. v. Dixie Demolition, LLC,51 for example,
the Austin Court of Appeals upheld the imposition of death-penalty sanctions
against plaintiffs who the trial court found had fabricated back-dated contracts
and a performance guarantee that formed the basis of their claims, and then
testified falsely about the documents in their depositions. 52 The court of appeals

44. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(1) (requiring that a pleading denying legal capacity be verified by
affidavit).
45. Flood, 408 S.W.3d at 651.
46. Id. at 650 (emphasis original).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 654 (citing Goswami v. Metro Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex.
1988)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 654–55.
51. JNS Enter., Inc. v. Dixie Demolition, LLC, 430 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—Austin, no pet.).
52. Id. at 447.
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quickly dispatched the plaintiffs’ argument that the lack of a prior order
compelling discovery or imposing lesser sanctions meant that imposition of
death-penalty sanctions was impermissible. The court stated that the nature of
the sanctionable conduct was such that it could not be corrected by a court
order, and less severe orders could not effectively address or punish the
conduct. 53 While the court correctly recognized that Texas law does not always
require that lesser sanctions first be tested (only that they be considered)54 the
opinion’s discussion of why such lesser sanctions could not have been effective is
fairly superficial. Instead, the court’s focus remained fixed on the particularly
egregious nature of the misconduct involved. In effect, the court was saying that
only this punishment fits the crime the plaintiffs committed.55 Perhaps, not
surprisingly, other courts have agreed that if anything justifies the immediate
imposition of death-penalty sanctions, it is this type of fabrication of evidence
and attempted corruption of the judicial process.56
The Texarkana Court of Appeals shot down a novel attempt to rely on the
“apex deposition” doctrine 57 in In re Titus County.58 Titus County initiated an
eminent domain proceeding to acquire property owned by a real estate company
and William D. Priefert, individually and as trustee. Priefert was also the chief
executive officer of the corporate defendant. When the County sought his
deposition, Priefert invoked the apex doctrine and submitted an affidavit stating
that he did not have personal or unique knowledge about the properties and
arguing that the County should be required to first depose the company’s chief
financial officer. The court of appeals rejected Priefert’s argument, explaining
that the apex doctrine does not automatically protect high-ranking corporate
officers in every case, but instead applies when they are noticed for deposition
solely because of their corporate position. 59 In addition, the doctrine does not
apply to preclude the deposition of a named party. 60 Therefore, even if Priefert
could avail himself of the apex protection in his role as chief executive officer,
he would still be subject to a deposition as one of the landowners and a party to
the condemnation claim. 61

53. Id. at 453.
54. Id. at 456.
55. Id. (“[T]he offensive conduct—i.e., fabricating the evidence necessary to support its claims—
trumpets that [plaintiffs’] claims lack merit.”).
56. Id. at 456–57 (citing Daniel v. Kelley Oil Corp., 981 S.W.2d 230, 235 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); First Nat’l Bank of La. v. Lustig, 96 F.3d 1554, 1573 (5th
Cir. 1996)); see also Gunn v. Fuqua, 397 S.W.3d 358, 375 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied)
(‘“Death penalty’ sanctions are appropriate as an initial sanction only in the egregious and
exceptional case when they are ‘clearly justified and it is fully apparent that no lesser sanctions
would promote compliance with the rules.’”) (quoting GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856
S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993)).
57. The term “apex” deposition refers to the deposition of a corporate party’s president or
similar high-ranking official. See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 127
(Tex. 1995). To prevent such depositions from being used as a litigation tactic merely to harass a
corporate defendant or apply settlement pressure, the Texas Supreme Court has developed
guidelines for when and how such depositions may be taken. Id. at 128.
58. In re Titus Cnty., 412 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.).
59. Id. at 35.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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A request for a pre-suit deposition of the Comptroller of Public Accounts
under Rule 202 62 was at issue in Combs v. The Texas Civil Rights Project. 63 The
Austin Court of Appeals rejected the Comptroller’s argument that the Rule 202
petition was an independent suit that was barred by sovereign immunity. 64 The
court went on to explain, however, that a pre-suit deposition cannot “be used
solely to investigate potential claims that are otherwise barred by sovereign
immunity.” 65 Examining the plaintiffs’ pleadings, the court of appeals concluded
that although the alleged conduct by the Comptroller would fall within the ultra
vires exception to sovereign immunity, such conduct would not support a claim
for retrospective relief (such as damages), and the plaintiffs’ pleadings and the
Comptroller’s evidence negated the possibility of an award of any type of
prospective relief. 66 Accordingly, the court vacated the order granting the Rule
202 petition and dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction. 67
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court provided guidance on what it termed the
“allied litigant” privilege in In re XL Specialty Insurance Co. 68 In this suit against a
workers’ compensation carrier, the injured employee sought discovery of
communications that passed between the insured employer and the carrier’s
outside counsel during the administrative proceeding. The supreme court held
that those communications were not privileged under Texas law. 69 The court
explained that, unlike what is often called the “common interest” privilege,
Texas Rule of Evidence 503(b)(1)(c) 70 protects only communications between a
client (or her lawyer) and the lawyer for another party made in the context of a
pending action. 71 Although the privilege is potentially available to all parties to
an action and not just defendants (hence the label “allied litigant” rather than
“joint defense”), it does not extend to communications made in furtherance of
joint or common interests outside of litigation. 72
In the case before it, the supreme court concluded that the allied litigant
privilege did not apply because the employer was neither represented by the
insurer’s attorney nor a party to the action. 73 The opinion recognizes, however,
that the workers’ compensation scenario is unusual because suit is brought
directly against the insurer and not the insured employer. 74 The supreme court
noted that the result may well be different in the more typical situation where an
insurer-retained counsel represents the insured in litigation and also
communicates with the insurer that pays the bills. 75 In the latter situation, the
62. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.
63. Combs v. The Tex. Civil Rights Project, 410 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet.
denied).
64. Id. at 534.
65. Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 537–38.
67. Id. at 538–49.
68. In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. 2012).
69. Id. at 56.
70. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(c).
71. XL Specialty, 373 S.W.3d at 51–52.
72. Id. at 52.
73. Id. at 53.
74. Id. at 54.
75. Id.
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retained lawyer might be found to represent both the insurer and the insured,76
or the insurer might be deemed a “representative” of the insured client within
the meaning of Rule 503 based on its right to retain counsel and control the
litigation. 77
VII. DISMISSAL
The Texas Supreme Court in CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood
Homeowner’s Association, Inc. 78 held that a plaintiff’s nonsuit during an appeal of
an action under Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code § 150.002(f) 79 would
not moot the defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s refusal to dismiss that action
with prejudice. 80 Suits for professional negligence against licensed engineers or
architects must be accompanied by an expert’s affidavit opining as to the claim’s
merits.81 If a plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the trial court must
dismiss the action, but that dismissal may be with or without prejudice. 82 Here,
after the plaintiff filed its suit, the defendant moved to dismiss, claiming that the
plaintiff’s supporting affidavit was deficient. The trial court denied the motion,
and the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal. Before the court of appeals
could rule, the plaintiff nonsuited the action. The appellate court then
dismissed the appeal as moot. The supreme court reversed, however, holding
that the defendant’s request for a dismissal with prejudice constituted a request
for affirmative relief that should survive the nonsuit, just as a defendant’s
request for sanctions survives a nonsuit. 83
In Roberts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 84 the trial court sent a letter to counsel
advising it had granted a motion for partial summary judgment and requesting
that an order be prepared reflecting that ruling. The plaintiff then nonsuited the
case before the court actually signed an order. The El Paso Court of Appeals
held that this nonsuit did not preclude the trial court from subsequently
entering an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.85 While a
plaintiff has an absolute right of nonsuit under Rule 162 86 prior to the
introduction of his evidence at trial, the act of signing a judgment that the trial
court had already rendered was merely administrative; thus, the plaintiff’s
nonsuit could not preclude the trial court from effectuating its order.87

76. Id. at 54–55. The supreme court reaffirmed that whether the insurer and the insured are
joint clients of the lawyer is a matter of contract between the parties. Id. at 55 (citing Unauthorized
Practice of Law Comm. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 261 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Tex. 2008)).
77. Id. at 55 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(2)).
78. CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 299 (Tex.
2013).
79. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(f).
80. CTL/Thompson, 390 S.W.3d at 300.
81. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(a).
82. Id. § 150.002(e).
83. CTL/Thompson, 390 S.W.3d at 300–01.
84. Roberts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 406 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.).
85. Id. at 706.
86. TEX. R. CIV. P. 162.
87. Roberts, 406 S.W.3d at 706.
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VIII. JURY PRACTICE
In In re Frank Kent Motor Co., the Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted
a writ of mandamus to enforce a jury waiver in the employment context. 88 The
supreme court held that the employer’s alleged threat to terminate an at-will
employee for not signing a jury waiver did not constitute coercion and would
not, therefore, invalidate the waiver. 89 The court reasoned that because the
employer had the right to terminate the employee at any time, the actual or
threatened exercise of that legitimate right would not void the waiver. 90
Analogizing to employment arbitration agreements, which courts have held may
also be enforced in the at-will context, the supreme court found no reason to
treat jury waivers differently. 91
In BNSF Railway Co. v. Wipff, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed
whether a trial court erred in denying a request to shuffle a jury panel that was
made after the jurors had completed a questionnaire “under penalty of
perjury.” 92 Although the trial court had denied the defendant’s request to
shuffle the panel as untimely because counsel had already received and reviewed
the questionnaire, the court of appeals rejected that conclusion because the trial
court had not yet delivered the instructions to the jury as required under Rule
226a. 93 The appellate court then determined that the trial court’s failure to
shuffle the jury was both presumed and proved harmful, as the defendant
showed that it had seated two objectionable jurors that it would have otherwise
struck had it not already used its other peremptory strikes. 94
IX. JUDGMENTS
Dueling judgments regarding the same real property were the subject of the
Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Texas Department of Transportation v. A.P.I. Pipe
and Supply, LLC. 95 In a condemnation action, the trial court originally entered
judgment in 2003 that gave the City of Edinburg fee-simple title in certain land,
subject to a drainage easement in favor of the Department of Transportation,
and awarded the landowner compensation. The following year, the trial court
entered a nunc pro tunc judgment pursuant to Rule 306a(6) 96 that “purported to
render the [original] 2003 judgment ‘null and void.’” 97 In the second judgment,
the City only received an easement, not fee-simple title. The original property
owner then purported to sell the property to a third party pursuant to the
second judgment. But the supreme court held that the second nunc pro tunc
judgment was void because it went far beyond simply correcting clerical errors in
88.
(2012)).
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

In re Frank Kent Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 632–33 (Tex., cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 167
Id. at 631.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 631–32.
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Wipff, 408 S.W.3d 662, 664–66 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.)
Id. at 647–68; TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a.
BNSF, 408 S.W.3d at 668–69.
Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 165 (Tex. 2012).
TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(6).
A.P.I., 397 S.W.3d at 165.
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the original judgment. 98 Therefore, any transfer of title based upon the second
judgment was also invalid.99
In two cases during the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court went to
great lengths to overturn default judgments that were attacked through a bill of
review. In Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enterprises, Inc.,100 the plaintiff filed suit
alleging breach of contract. The defendant hired counsel who filed an answer
and a special appearance. While the clerk sent notice of the trial setting to
defendant’s counsel, the defendant did not receive such notice either directly or
from its counsel. The attorney neither appeared for trial nor challenged the
approximately $1.4 million post-answer default judgment entered against the
defendant. In response to collection efforts to enforce the judgment, the
defendant immediately hired new counsel who filed an unseccessful restricted
appeal. 101 The supreme court allowed the bill of review, finding that the
defendant had no actual notice of the trial setting or the default judgment
entered against it. 102 As the court noted, “we have never held that a party must
show that it diligently monitored the case status, especially after a party hires an
attorney to represent it.” 103 In short, the court seemed unwilling to penalize the
defendant for the negligence of its first counsel where it demonstrated its
diligence immediately upon learning of the judgment.
Similarly, in PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, the supreme court granted a bill of
review challenging a default judgment that had been entered nine years earlier,
finding that there was some evidence of extrinsic fraud that tolled the applicable
four-year limitations period. 104 In this dispute, the plaintiff first sued the
defendant in a slip-and-fall case in state court in 1998. After the defendant
removed the case to federal court, the federal court granted summary judgment
for the defendant in 2000, but it dismissed the case without prejudice. Three
months later (after limitations had run), the plaintiff filed a second suit
regarding the same incident and served the defendant through its registered
agent without notifying its counsel. The trial court then entered a default
judgment against the defendant for approximately $1.5 million. The plaintiff
waited six years to abstract the judgment and then another three years to
attempt execution. By that time, the judgment was worth over $3.5 million
dollars. Obviously suspicious of the lengthy delay, the supreme court found
some evidence of extrinsic fraud where the plaintiff’s counsel knew, but failed to
provide the clerk with, the defendant’s last known address, which meant the
defendant did not receive notice of the default judgment. 105 This, the court
reasoned, was sufficient to raise a fact issue on the limitations defense.106
Finally, in Phillips v. Bramlett, the Texas Supreme Court held that “where an
appellate court remands a case to the trial court for entry of judgment consistent
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 166–68.
Id. at 168.
Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enter., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 809, 810 (Tex. 2012).
Id. at 811.
Id. at 813.
Id.
PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 275 (Tex. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 277.
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with [its] opinion, and the trial court is not required to admit new or additional
evidence to enter that judgment,” post-judgment interest should accrue from the
date of the original judgment rather than from the date of the new judgment. 107
X. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In In re Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, the Texas Supreme Court
announced the rule that when a trial court grants a motion for new trial, it must
articulate a reasonably specific basis for doing so beyond being “in the interests
of justice and fairness.” 108 In two opinions during the Survey period, the high
court expounded on that ruling and highlighted the challenges that trial judges
often face in adjudicating motions for new trials. First, in In re United Scaffolding,
Inc., the supreme court held that a trial court did not satisfy Columbia Medical
Center’s edict when it granted a new trial based upon several grounds, the last of
which was “in the interests of justice and fairness,” with each of the listed
grounds separated by the phrase “and/or.” 109 This phrase, the supreme court
reasoned, left open the possibility that “in the interests of justice and fairness”
could have been the only ground for granting a new trial, which would not be
proper under Columbia Medical Center. 110
Second, in In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., the supreme court held that even
where the trial court has properly articulated its ground for granting a new trial,
an appellate court may nonetheless conduct its own independent review of the
merits of that decision. 111 In this wrongful death case, the plaintiff’s counsel
inadvertently introduced certain evidence at trial that it had sought to exclude
by a motion in limine. Thereafter, the defendant’s counsel referenced that
evidence during both witness examinations and closing argument, correctly
noting that the plaintiff’s counsel had already placed the evidence before the
jury. The trial court granted a new trial, claiming that the defendant’s counsel
had violated a limine order and referenced evidence outside the record. The
supreme court held that while great deference is given to the trial court’s
judgment, the record did not support this stated basis for granting a new trial,
and it therefore granted mandamus relief. 112
Writing on the first element of the Craddock 113 test for setting aside default
judgments—i.e., “that the defendants’ failure to answer was neither intentional
nor the result of conscious indifference”—the Texas Supreme Court reversed a
$1.8 million default judgment in Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp. 114
The defendant’s representative in that case testified that he did not recall being

107. Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tex. 2013).
108. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. 2009).
109. In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 687–89 (Tex. 2012).
110. Id. at 689. Beyond the specific holding in the case before it, the supreme court also added
its voice to those courts and commentators who have sharply criticized the use of “and/or” in any
legal writing. Id. at 689 and n.3.
111. In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 407 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Tex. 2013).
112. Id. at 758–59.
113. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
114. Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307, 308–09 (Tex. 2012)
(per curiam).
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served or turning the petition over to legal counsel, as was the normal practice.
Although plaintiff presented evidence from a witness who saw the process server
hand-deliver service of process to the defendant’s representative, the court noted
that the plaintiff had not controverted the representative’s testimony (nor could
it have) that he could not recall receiving the pleadings. Likewise, plaintiff had
not controverted the representative’s testimony detailing the normal procedure
he observed of turning the suit over to its counsel when the company was
served. Therefore, the court found that the defendant had not acted
intentionally or with conscious indifference toward the suit and remanded the
case for a trial on the merits. 115
In Sutherland v. Spencer, the Texas Supreme Court overturned a default
judgment even where both defendants acknowledged having been served but
simply forgot to answer. 116 The plaintiff did not (and likely could not) controvert
the defendants’ excuse that they did not answer the suit because they left the
citations in a stack of papers on a desk at their office and were away because of
bad weather and the Christmas holiday season. The majority held that this
excuse was sufficient to prove that the defendants had not acted intentionally or
with conscious indifference. 117 This holding prompted a lengthy dissent that “I
forgot” is not an acceptable excuse for late tax returns or missing homework
assignments and should not satisfy the standard for new trial motions either. 118
XI. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Although it arose in a criminal context, the discussion in Youkers v. State 119
regarding a judge’s use of social media should be of interest to civil trial
practitioners as well. In this case of first impression, the Dallas Court of Appeals
addressed whether a trial judge’s status as Facebook “friends” with a litigant
should constitute a ground for recusal. The court of appeals noted that no rule
or canon of ethics prohibits a judge’s use of social media, and that “judges do
not ‘forfeit [their] right to associate with [their] friends and acquaintances nor
[are they] condemned to live the life of a hermit.’” 120 Just as a judge is not
automatically required to recuse because she has a business relationship or
casual friendship with a party, the mere designation of someone as a Facebook
“friend” is insufficient to reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. 121 This is
a subject that will undoubtedly continue to arise in the recusal context, and the
court of appeals’ approach in Youkers provides a sensible framework for
evaluating such motions.

115. Id. at 310.
116. Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752, 755–56 (Tex. 2012).
117. Id. at 755.
118. Id. at 756 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
119. Youkers v. State, 400 S.W.3d 200, 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d).
120. Id. at 205 (quoting Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Board Tex. Op. 39 (1978)). The court also
noted that because Texas has an elected judiciary, judges use the internet and social media for
campaigning and fundraising. Id.
121. Id. at 206.
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XII. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In re Texas Windstorm Insurance Association 122 involved an unusual scenario in
which the City of Santa Fe and its attorney sought to disqualify the opposing
counsel because he had previously represented the city’s attorney but not the city
itself. The City, represented by Craig Eiland, sued the Texas Windstorm
Insurance Association (TWIA) for failure to properly pay overhead and profit on
a Hurricane Ike claim. TWIA hired Chris Martin to defend the suit. Some
twenty months before, however, Martin had consulted with and advised Eiland
in connection with a similar claim against TWIA that Eiland was handling for
Galveston County. Indeed, Eiland testified that he had sought out Martin’s
expertise with respect to the overhead and profit issue in particular. The City
and Eiland filed motions to disqualify Martin, which the trial court granted. 123
A divided First District Court of Appeals disagreed that sufficient ground for
disqualification had been established, however, and conditionally granted
mandamus relief. 124
Although the evidence was disputed, the trial court found as a factual matter
that Martin had a prior attorney-client relationship with Eiland, and the court of
appeals was required to accept that finding for purposes of mandamus review. 125
Nevertheless, the majority held that Martin’s representation of TWIA did not
violate the disciplinary rule governing former-client conflicts of interest. 126 The
majority emphasized that Martin’s former client was not the City but Eiland,
who was not a party to the case before it. 127 Although the court recognized that
the person seeking disqualification does not necessarily have to be a partyopponent, there must still be a level of adversity between him and his former
lawyer that justifies the presumption that the lawyer’s current representation
posed a risk of unfair prejudice to the movant. 128 In concluding that was not the
case, the court observed that Eiland had, in his prior representation of
Galveston County, already disclosed to TWIA the substance of the arguments
about overhead and profit that Martin had suggested to him. 129 In sum, the
majority found that the only real “risk to Eiland is that opposing counsel will be
vigorously advancing arguments against his clients in these cases, which is a
situation in every adversarial lawsuit and is not the concern of Rule 1.09.” 130
The majority also concluded that the two matters were not substantially
related, even accepting the trial court’s factual finding that Martin had obtained
122. In re Texas Windstorm Ins. Ass’n, 417 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,
orig. proceeding).
123. Id. at 125.
124. Id. at 140.
125. Id. at 136.
126. Id. at 130–32. Rule 1.09(a) prohibits a lawyer “who personally has formerly represented a
client in a matter” from thereafter representing “another person in a matter adverse to the former
client: . . .(2) if the representation in reasonable probability will involve a violation of Rule 1.05; or
(3) if it is the same or a substantially related matter.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.09(a), reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2009) (Tex. State Bar R.
art. X, § 9).
127. TWIA, 417 S.W.3d at 130.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 131.
130. Id. at 132.
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confidential information about Eiland’s handling of Hurricane Ike cases
through his prior representation. 131 Specifically, the opinion notes again that
Eiland himself was not asserting a claim against TWIA, and there was no
evidence that the “lawyer-to-lawyer consultation” was specifically related to the
City’s claims against TWIA.132 And even though the two matters had issues in
common, such as the overhead and profit issue and the substantive claim, that
did not compel disqualification in the absence of evidence that the underlying
facts were sufficiently similar. 133
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Terry Jennings took the majority to task for
substituting its factual determinations for those of the trial judge who heard all
of the evidence over the course of a five-day hearing. 134 The dissent argued that
whether matters are substantially related is a “fact-intensive inquiry of whether ‘a
lawyer could have acquired confidential information concerning a prior client
that could be used either to that prior client’s disadvantage or for the advantage
of the lawyer’s current client or some other person.’” 135 Given the trial judge’s
finding, which was supported by competent evidence, that Martin had in fact
obtained confidential information about Eiland’s negotiation and litigation
strategies for these claims, the dissent reasonably questioned how the majority
could find an abuse of discretion. 136 Rather than strictly adhering to the
standards for mandamus review, therefore, it appears the majority was trying to
erect a bulwark against a wave of future disqualification motions based on these
types of lawyer-to-lawyer consultations. 137
XIII. MISCELLANEOUS
In In re Service Corp. International,138 the Texas Supreme Court had the
opportunity to determine when it is appropriate for a trial court to appoint an
arbitrator. After the defendant answered and asserted that the dispute was
subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement, the parties were unable to agree
on an arbitrator. The plaintiff asked the court to appoint an arbitrator, claiming
that the defendant had waived its right to seek an appointment by the American
Arbitration Association (AAA). The trial court agreed and selected an arbitrator.
The defendant then filed a petition for writ of mandamus.
The parties agreed that the dispute was governed by Section 5 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, which provides that the court shall designate the arbitrator if
any party fails to avail itself of a contractually agreed-upon method for selecting
an arbitrator. 139 In this case, the arbitration contract provided: “[T]he arbitrator

131. Id. at 135.
132. Id. at 136.
133. Id. at 136–37.
134. Id. at 147–48 (Jennings, J. dissenting).
135. Id. at 149–50 (quoting TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.09(a) cmt. 4B)
(emphasis added by Justice Jennings).
136. Id. at 149–50.
137. Indeed, Justice Jennings’ dissent was sympathetic, noting that he too might have reached
the same conclusion if he was sitting as the factfinder. Id. at 141.
138. In re Serv. Corp. Int’l, 355 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam).
139. Id. at 658–59; 9 U.S.C. § 5.
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shall be selected by mutual agreement of the parties. If the parties fail to or are
unable to agree on the selection of an appropriate arbitrator, the AAA shall
select the arbitrator pursuant to its rules and procedures upon the application of
one or both parties.” 140
The arbitration agreement therefore set forth only two ways for the parties to
select an arbitrator: (1) mutual agreement; or (2) if the parties cannot agree, the
AAA selects the arbitrator. Thus, the supreme court analyzed whether one or
both of the parties “failed to avail” itself of the agreed-upon arbitrator selection
method or if there was a “lapse” in the selection of an arbitrator. The supreme
court held that these exceptions in Section 5 should only be invoked by the trial
court when there is some “mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection
process” or if “one of the parties refuses to comply, thereby delaying arbitration
indefinitely.” 141 In this case, the court found that a seven month delay did not
qualify as either a lapse or failure to avail because it included the period in
which the parties tried to reach agreement and did in fact agree on an arbitrator,
“only to have him recused” because of a conflict of interest. 142 The trial court
selected an arbitrator only one month after the agreed-upon arbitrator had been
disqualified. Under these circumstances, the court determined that the trial
court had abused its discretion in not allowing the AAA the opportunity to
select the arbitrator. 143
In Ellman v. JC General Contractors, 144 the El Paso Court of Appeals found that
the defendants had substantially invoked the judicial process so as to waive their
right to arbitration. In January 2009, the plaintiff filed its original petition. A
few days later, the defendants answered, raising special exceptions and
affirmative defenses, and asserted counterclaims for breach of contract, fraud,
breach of warranty, and declaratory judgment. The parties engaged in extensive
discovery, and the trial court set the case for trial on July 12, 2010. On June 7,
2010, the parties filed a joint motion for continuance on the ground they would
not be ready for trial and needed to conduct additional discovery. The trial
court granted the joint motion for continuance, and for the next eight months,
the parties engaged in additional discovery. In February 2011, the trial court
entered an order setting a pretrial conference on December 14, 2011, and a jury
trial on January 23, 2012. The trial court also ordered the parties to mediation.
The parties continued to engage in discovery and the defendants prepared and
filed pretrial materials. Finally, “on October 11, 2011, thirty-five months after
filing suit, and approximately three and one-half months before the trial
setting,” defendants asserted a demand for arbitration. 145 After making this
demand, however, defendants continued to take depositions and filed a motion
to compel discovery in addition to their motion to compel arbitration.
The court of appeals first noted that the plaintiff faced a very high burden to
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
pet.)
145.

Serv. Corp., 355 S.W.3d at 659.
Id.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 661.
Ellman v. JC Gen. Contractors, 419 S.W.3d 516, 521–22 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no
Id. at 519.
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demonstrate that the defendants had substantially invoked the judicial process
to the plaintiff’s prejudice. The court then reviewed several cases where, despite
significant litigation activity, the Texas courts found no waiver of a party’s right
to arbitration. 146 In this case, however, the court found that the defendant had
substantially invoked the judicial process and waived its right to arbitration
because of the considerable delay, expense, and damage to the plaintiff’s legal
position. 147 Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff had been prejudiced
because it had revealed its entire legal strategy during the pendency of the
litigation. 148

146. Id. at 521 (citing Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1991);
Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int’l, 770 F.2d 416, 420–21 (5th Cir. 1985); Gen. Guar. Ins. Co. v.
New Orleans Gen. Agency, Inc., 427 F.2d 924, 928–29 (5th Cir. 1970)).
147. Id. at 522.
148. Id.

